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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

79-5032

NO. [redacted]

EDDIE SPRAGGINS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

ARTHUR K. BOLTON
Attorney General

ROBERT S. STUBBS, II
Executive Assistant
Attorney General

DON A. LANGHAM
First Assistant
Attorney General

JOHN C. WALDEN
Senior Assistant
Attorney General

JOHN W. DUNSMORE, JR.
Assistant Attorney
General

Please serve:

JOHN W. DUNSMORE, JR.
132 State Judicial Bldg.
40 Capitol Square, S. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-3358

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Did the trial court's instructions during sentencing fail to convey to the jurors all of the various mitigating factors, as well as to inform them that they could impose a life sentence even if they found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the statutory aggravating circumstances?

2.

Was it error for the jurors in the second trial to hear and view all of the evidence adduced at the first trial?

3.

Does the Supreme Court of Georgia's appellate review of Petitioner's death sentence comply with its statutory obligation under Georgia law?

4.

Does the submission of an additional statutory aggravating circumstance on a new trial for sentencing constitute double joepardy?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Eddie Spraggins, hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner, is under a sentence of death in the State of Georgia following his conviction in the Superior Court of Meriwether County in 1977, for the murder of Francis Coe in January of 1977. As a result of his conviction in 1977, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Petitioner's conviction, but granted him a new trial as to sentencing because the Court found that the jurors had not been adequately instructed during the sentencing phase, in that the trial judge should have told the jurors that even though they found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any of the statutory aggravating circumstances put forth by the State, that they could nevertheless still impose a life sentence. Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759, 243 S.E.2d 10 (1978).[1/] Later a new jury for resentencing was selected, and after being presented with the same evidence which the State presented earlier in 1977, that jury sentenced Petitioner to death for the murder of Ms. Coe. The Supreme Court of Georgia on appeal affirmed that sentence. Spraggins v. State, 243 Ga. 73, 252 S.E.2d 620 (1979). This Court on April 30, 1979, in an order by Justice Powell, extended the period of time in which the Petitioner could file for a writ of certiorari.

1/ Petitioner's co-defendant also received the death penalty, but his sentence to death was likewise vacated for the same reason as Petitioner. Davis v. State, 240 Ga. 763, 243 S.E.2d 12 (1978). Following a new trial for sentencing, co-defendant Davis received a death sentence again. Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1979); Petition for Certiorari No. 78-5032, presently before this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Around 1:30 p.m. on the snowy afternoon of January 31, 1977, Elsie Hutchinson thought it rather unusual that the back door to the home of her Meriwether County, Georgia, neighbor Francis Coe, was opened. Upon entering her neighbor's house Ms. Hutchinson discovered the gruesome sight of her neighbor lying on her bed. Ms. Hutchinson immediately left and went across to a neighbor's home to have the police called.

Georgia Bureau of Investigation Officer Bert Davis described the condition of the murder victim as follows:

> "On the bed on the right, Ms. Coe was lying with her head in the direction of the wall, and her feet down onto the floor. She was in a semi-nude condition, panties and pantyhose had been pulled down and were still attached to the left foot. She wore a slip which was pulled up here in the area of the breast and had on a green sweater which was open. There were numerous lacerations to the throat. It was cut just practically out. Further examination revealed a deep cut here in her eye which appeared to be a bruise type cut and not a slash. Numerous stab marks and slashes in the chest area and a slash mark on her breast, slash marks in the abdomen area on the left side, one approximately 5 inches. From the top of the vagina up through the navel, Ms. Coe was split open. The intestines were pulled from the stomach and lying on top of her stomach."

The autopsy which was later performed revealed that the cause of death was due to a loss of blood. There were several wounds to the body which caused the victim to bleed heavily, with the most severe stab wounds being in the upper abdomen and lower chest, including two in the upper abdomen which penetrated the heart. There was also evidence that there had been some manipulation to the victim's sexual organs. Particularly, there were two areas of injury in the vicinity of the vaginal opening. The second injury consisted of bruising around the vaginal orifice. The autopsy further indicated that there was a considerable amount of hemorrhaging around the urethera, as well as there being a small tear in the vaginal orifice.

During the course of the investigation the law enforcement officers were led to the yard of Petitioner's residence. A search of Petitioner's yard was occasioned by virtue of the fact that a neighbor on the night of the murder had seen something burning in Petitioner's back yard. With the consent of Petitioner's mother the law enforcement officers uncovered from a pile of ashes a zipper and cloth material which appeared to come from a jacket, as well as a flashlight which had recently been borrowed from the victim.

A Georgia Bureau of Investigation Agent later confronted Petitioner with the evidence which he had gathered to date on Ms. Coe's murder. After being advised of his rights Petitioner gave a statement. In that statement Petitioner implicated Freddie Davis by stating that Davis went to Francis Coe's house on Sunday, January 30, 1977. Petitioner stated that he had been talking about robbing Ms. Coe for some time. Petitioner went to the front door of the Coe residence while Davis remained at the back door. To gain entrance into Ms. Coe's house Petitioner used

excuse that he wanted to use the telephone. Upon gaining entrance to the house Petitioner forced Ms. Coe to open the back door, but she refused and started to scream. Petitioner proceeded to grab Ms. Coe from around the neck and opened the door in order to let co-defendant in. Petitioner then dragged Ms. Coe to the bedroom while at the same time keeping his hand over her mouth to keep her from screaming. Davis then told Petitioner to "Shut her up." In making this remark Davis handed Petitioner a knife, following which Petitioner proceeded to stab Ms. Coe as well as to cut her throat. Petitioner told the officer that Ms. Coe would not die, and that he kept cutting her, with Davis saying, "You got to finish her off." After eventually subduing Ms. Coe, Petitioner said that he wiped the blood off his hands and gave Davis back his knife. Davis then used the victim's flashlight in order to look for money. Petitioner later burned the windbreaker he was wearing behind his house. Davis returned the flashlight to Petitioner after they left Ms. Coe's house.

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT

A. THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE TRIAL DO NOT SUFFER FROM ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCY AS URGED BY THE PETITIONER.

The Petitioner's first trial was specifically set aside because the trial judge failed to inform the jurors that even if they found the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance they could nevertheless impose the death penalty and further, because the jury had not been instructed that they could consider mitigating circumstances in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty. Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759 (1978). Now the Petitioner argues that the sentencing instructions are still defective in that the Court did not spell out the fact that the jurors were to consider the particular characteristics of the accused as well as once again failing to tell the jurors that they could nevertheless impose a life sentence even if they found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court of Georgia initially granted Petitioner and his co-defendant a new trial because of the failure of the trial court to make this proposition clear to the jury. On retrial for sentencing this defect was cured. Spraggins v. State, 243 Ga. 73, 76 (1979). Petitioner has failed to show where the sentencing instructions on retrial suffer from any constitutional deficiency.[2/]

This Court has long stated that instructions should be viewed as a whole as they will not be judged in artifical isolation. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973). The Georgia Statute unlike

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2/ See Page 299 in Petitioner's Appendix D.

the statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), do not suffer from the constitutional deficiencies of having a jury impose the death penalty without considering mitigating circumstances, or limiting the mitigating circumstances. To the contrary, in Georgia the trial court fully informs the jurors that they may consider any mitigating factors, the decision as to what constitutes a mitigating factor or circumstance being left to the jurors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has made it clear that the trial court does not have to spell out what constitutes a mitigating circumstance, since the jurors are free in their own discretion to make that decision. See, Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978); Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 246 S.E.2d 288 (1978); Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1 (1978). Sub judice, the jurors were given a full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances which would include their consideration on any aspects of the Petitioner's character and record that they so desired. Spraggins v. State, supra, at p. 76.

The Petitioner also complains about the fact that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently defined or that examples of mitigating circumstances were not provided. As noted above, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that it is not necessary for the trial court to specify or single out for the jurors what might be considered as a mitigating circumstance, since to do so might place a limitation on the jurors' discretion as to what they were to consider as a mitigating circumstance. If the Court were to spell out what the mitigating circumstances were in a particular case, then the petitioner would come back and state that the jurors had been unnecessarily limited to those mitigating circumstances, stating that there may have been others and giving examples of those. Clearly, the better practice, and the practice in Georgia,

is for the Court to inform the jurors that they may consider mitigating circumstances, and to define mitigating circumstances as being those circumstances which do not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability or blame on the accused. The trial court's instruction on mitigation in this instance was clearly sufficient, and since the term mitigating circumstance was defined, no further elaboration was required because the word mitigating is a common term within a juror's understanding. See, United States v. Beasley, 519 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1975), rehng. den., 522 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976).

B. AT A TRIAL FOR RESENTENCING THE NEW JURORS ARE ENTITLED TO HEAR AND SEE ALL THE EVIDENCE FROM THE GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE IN ORDER TO CONSIDER ITS IMPORT SO IT CAN CARRY OUT ITS SENTENCING ROLE.

Petitioner contends that it was error for the new jury empanelled to arrive at a sentence to see and hear the evidence which an earlier jury viewed. It is especially contended that photos of the murder victim should have been kept from the jury's view.

The admissibility of photographs in a murder case, particularly where those photographs may be unpleasant, rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge. See, United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. den., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976). Generally speaking the admissibility of photographs does not rise to constitutional dimensions. Talbot v. Nelson, 390 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. den.. 393 U.S. 868 (1968). While the photographs in issue may be gruesome they are not inadmissible for that reason alone. United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 420 U.S. 961 (1975). Petitioner has failed to show that the photographs of the person he murdered were so inflammatory or gruesome that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. United States v. Hoog, supra.

The use of photographs of murder victims, regardless of how gruesome they may be, becomes extremely relevant when the State is seeking the death penalty, since they bear directly on the question as to whether the accused's acts fall within one of the statutory aggravating circumstances contained in the Georgia death penalty statute which the State may be putting forth at a later portion of the trial. In this case the photographs depicting the mutilated body of the victim were both relevant and material, and their

admission into evidence was not for the purposes of inflaming the minds and passions of the jury, nor did their introduction into evidence correspondingly cause the jury to impose the death penalty on Petitioner. These photographs were relevant to aid the jury in depicting the crime scene and to provide a more meaningful manner in which to apply the evidence to the case, and thus were admitted to assist the court and jury in better understanding the case for the purposes of sentencing. Even though Petitioner may have admitted that he injured a certain person, this does not preclude their admissibility into evidence to show the actual dismemberment which may have occurred at the Petitioner's hands. United States v. Morton, 493 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974).

For this reason the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

C. THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS WHICH THIS COURT APPROVED OF IN GREGG[3/] NOR HAS IT PERMITTED ONE OF THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH TO BECOME A "CATCHALL."

The jury during the Petitioner's resentencing trial found that the Petitioner should be sentenced to death in that his crime encompassed two statutory aggravating circumstances contained in Georgia Laws 1973, pp. 159, 163; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(2)(7).

The Petitioner states that the seventh aggravating circumstance, namely the offense of murder, was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhumane in that it involved a torture and depravity of mind on the part of the defendant or an aggravated battery to the victim is unconstitutional in that it has not been narrowly applied by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and as such is a catchall statutory aggravating circumstance.

Respondent submits that the germane issue in this matter is whether the Petitioner's sentence to death under the statutory aggravating circumstance is warranted by the evidence prior to any consideration being given to whether or not the Supreme Court of Georgia has not limited the application of this statutory aggravating circumstance. Based upon the statement of facts which is in the first portion of this brief, it cannot be said that under the circumstances of this case (the facts are so horrifying) that the murder was not outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible

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3/ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 156 (1976).

and inhumane, or that it did not involve the torture and depravity of mind on the part of the defendant or an aggravated battery to the victim. Clearly, the cutting open of the abdominal area of the rape victim, causing to be exposed the visceral organs contained therein offends anyone's sense of decency, and clearly exhibits a depravity of mind on the part of the Petitioner, as well as an aggravated battery to the victim. Furthermore, the cases in which this statutory aggravating circumstance has been considered by the Georgia Supreme Court have been carefully reviewed and there are no cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia has permitted this seventh statutory aggravating circumstance to become a general receptacle for upholding the death penalty. On the basis of the facts in this case the evidence was so clear and convincing that there was no necessity or a requirement that the jurors be informed as to what constituted torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery, since the evidence clearly established all of the requirements as contained in the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance. The facts in this case do not lead to the conclusion that the jurors were given unbridled discretion, since the facts were so wantonly vile that they almost defy description.

Lastly, the Supreme Court of Georgia has not abandoned its appellate role in considering similar cases in determining "whether the sentence to death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2537(c)(3).

Furthermore, the appendix of cases considered by the Supreme Court of Georgia in carrying out its appellate statutory review function clearly demonstrates that in the six years since the revised

death penalty was invoked in Georgia that they are considering cases of like circumstances wherein the death penalty for a similar statutory aggravating circumstance has been imposed. The conclusory allegations made by the Petitioner simply fail to establish that the Supreme Court of Georgia is not carrying out the review function which this Court earlier reviewed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 156 (1976), a procedure which was created and established by the General Assembly of Georgia.

The Petitioner's contentions surrounding the appellate review process in Georgia fail to demonstrate that certiorari in regard to the Petitioner's case is warranted.

D. THE SUBMISSION AT A RETRIAL FOR SENTENCING OF AN ADDITIONAL STATUTORY CIRCUMSTANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

The Petitioner as noted earlier was granted a new trial on sentencing by the Supreme Court of Georgia. In the first trial the District Attorney submitted for the jurors' consideration the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, that being rape. Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2434.1(2). At the resentencing trial the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance, namely that the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim was also included for the jurors' consideration. Petitioner argues that this constitutes double jeopardy, in that he was not on notice as to that circumstance at the first trial, and as such the State should be precluded from putting forth an additional statutory aggravating circumstance based upon the same evidence at a subsequent trial for resentencing. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that double jeopardy was not involved, since the evidence at the first trial was identical to that which was presented in the second trial, and consequently the Petitioner was on notice since the evidence was the same as that in the first trial. Spraggins v. State, supra.

Petitioner's double jeopardy theory seems to be that since the jurors in the first trial were not asked to consider the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance, that in essence the failure to submit that statutory aggravating circumstance at his first trial constitutes an acquittal thereof. Since the first seventh aggravating circumstance was not submitted to the

jury it cannot be said that he was acquitted thereof, and as such the double jeopardy argument must fail. Petitioner would seemingly rely upon the holding in the case of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), in support of his double jeopardy provision. Ashe, supra, is inapplicable in that, in that case the petitioner was charged with six counts of armed robbery arising out of one transaction or occurrence. There the jury acquitted on one count, and as such the State was constitutionally prohibited from relitigating the issue again as to other robbery victims. In this case the Petitioner was never made to run the gauntlet of having a jury consider the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance.

Neither can it be said that the submission of a second statutory aggravating circumstance at his tiral for resentencing was to have a chilling effect as a result of the Petitioner having earlier exercised his appellate rights. This contention has no basis at all, since the Petitioner in Georgia is entitled as a matter of law to an automatic appeal from any conviction in which he receives the death penalty. Ga. Laws 1973, pp. 159-165; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2537(a).

Neither is there any evidence in this matter to indicate that the District Attorney's action in submitting an additional statutory aggravating circumstance for the jury's consideration constitutes vindictiveness. See, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Since the Petitioner did not receive a greater sentence on retrial, but received the same sentence he earlier received, his retrial did not subject him to a greater punishment than that which was imposed at the first trial. Further, because the jurors were not called upon to consider the additional statutory aggravating circumstance in the first trial the submission of same in the second trial does not constitute double jeopardy. See, Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). See also, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).

For these reasons, the submission during the penalty phase at the Petitioner's second trial of a statutory aggravating circumstance not considered at the first trial does not constitute double jeopardy.

CONCLUSION

This Court should refuse to grant a writ of certiorari because no sufficient reasons for review have been set forth by Petitioner.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR K. BOLTON
Attorney General

ROBERT S. STUBBS, II
Executive Assistant
Attorney General

DON A. LANGHAM
First Assistant
Attorney General

JOHN C. WALDEN
Senior Assistant
Attorney General

JOHN W. DUNSMORE, JR.
Assistant Attorney
General

Please serve:

JOHN W. DUNSMORE, JR.
132 State Judicial Bldg.
40 Capitol Square, S. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-3358

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, John C. Walden, Attorney of Record for Respondent, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have this day served true and correct copies of the Brief for Respondent in Opposition upon the Petitioner's attorney by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail, with proper address and adequate postage to:

Mr. Taylor Briggs
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
140 Broadway
New York, New York 10005

This 6th day of August, 1979.

JOHN C. WALDEN

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ARTHUR K. BOLTON
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